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The German mystics were particularly important for Kierkegaard because of the 
proximity of Germany to Denmark and because of their influence on both 
German idealism and the Pietist tradition in which Kierkegaard was raised. This 
article is the first attempt to look at the issue of how the views of the German 
mystics may have influenced Kierkegaard’s though. It begins with an introduction 
to what one could call mystical epistemology, but then looks more specifically at 
the epistemology of two medieval German mystics, Meister Eckhart and 
Johannes Tauler, and at Kierkegaard’s exposure to the German mystical 
tradition. Finally, it presents an account of Kierkegaard’s own religious 
epistemology that makes clear that it is largely indistinguishable from the 
epistemology of Ekhardt and Tauler. 
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Introduction 
“Danish civilization,” writes Thorleifr Gudmunson Repp in 1845, in the preface to 
the first lexicographically defensible Danish-English Dictionary, 
is in fact in every particular essentially German, and Denmark has for 
ages become so much accustomed to German dictature and supremacy 
in intellectual matters, that an emancipation from it would be suicidal to 
Danish culture and entirely check the progress of enlightenment in 
Denmark. … Danish civilization and literature accordingly are subject to, 
and must for all time to come be perpetually subject to German influence. 
… If owing to physical as well as moral causes, Denmark is a kind of 
Galilee to Germany (Germany being considered as Palestine), that 
circumstance must never be lost sight of by any one who treats of its 
language, its literature, or its history.1 
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 The influence of Germany on Danish culture rarely was lost sight of in 
Kierkegaard’s day. Danes were deeply ambivalent about their relation to 
Germany. On the one hand, they looked up to Germany as more cultured and 
cultivated than provincial Denmark, but on the other Danes were fiercely 
determined to assert their own national character over and against that of the 
Germans. Kierkegaard, made merciless fun of his compatriots, whom he felt 
would sometimes “speak in German” because of their inability to “speak 
philosophically.”2 He often appears to ridicule Germans, but closer inspection of 
these passages generally reveals that his true target is Danes. He pokes fun in, 
for example, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, of the German “assistant 
professor,” but in commenting on a review of the Postscript, he observes: 
for a long time now here in Denmark certain ones have made themselves 
important by what they have learned from the Germans and rendered 
practically word for word (as if it were their own), what they have compiled 
{from}various diverse German thinkers, professors, assistant professors, 
tutors, etc. (Pap. X6 B 128.)3 
 Kierkegaard’s attitude toward Germans and Germany cannot have been 
subtle to his contemporaries. It would not have escaped their notice that his real 
contempt is reserved for Danes who slavishly emulated Germans in respects he 
considered superficial as is evident, for example, in his reflections from 1854 on 
the German word Windbeutel, or “windbag,” as we say in English. 
It is an extraordinary word; I envy the Germans for having it … 
The Germans have the word because there is such continual use for it in 
Germany. 
We Danes do not have the word, but that which the word designates is not 
characteristic of us Danes either. Being a windbag really does not belong 
to the Danish national character. 
However, we Danes do have another fault, and the Danish language also 
has a word for it, a word which the German language perhaps does not 
have: windsucker [Windsluger]. 
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This is just about the way it is–a German makes wind–and a Dane 
swallows it–Danes and Germans have been related to each other in this 
way for a long time. (Pap. XI1 A 183.) 
But if Germans, on Kierkegaard’s view, tended to be windbags, the fact 
that they were generally superior scholars was not lost on him. He occasionally 
refers approvingly to German scholarship.4 Unfortunately, few contemporary 
scholars appear to appreciate the respect with which Kierkegaard viewed at least 
some German thought, hence most miss the positive influence this thought had 
on him. This is undoubtedly part of the reason that almost no attention has been 
given to the subject of the influence of German mysticism on Kierkegaard’s 
thought.  
This is not the only reason, however, for the neglect. What few explicit 
references Kierkegaard makes to mysticism tend to be pejorative.  The task of 
understanding Kierkegaard’s relation to mysticism is complicated even further by 
the fact that an understanding of Kierkegaard’s epistemology is essential to 
understanding this relation and few scholars, for reasons I address in my book 
Ways of Knowing,5 have dared to venture out onto the apparently murky waters 
of that area of Kierkegaard’s thought.  
 The German mystics were particularly important for Kierkegaard because 
of the proximity of Germany to Denmark and because of their influence on both 
German idealism and the Pietist tradition in which Kierkegaard was raised.  
There is, to my knowledge, only one examination of Kierkegaard’s relation to 
German mysticism, Peter Sajda’s article “Kierkegaard’s Encounter with the 
Rhineland-Flemish Mystics: A Case Study.”6 The subject of Sajda’s article, 
however, is Kierkegaard’s exposure to the German mystics. He devotes almost 
no attention to the issue of the substantive influence these figures had on 
Kierkegaard’s thought.  
The present article is thus the first attempt to look at the issue of how the 
views of the German mystics may have influenced Kierkegaard’s own thought. It 
will begin with an introduction to what one could call mystical epistemology.  
Next, it will look more specifically at the epistemology of two medieval German 
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mystics, Meister Eckhart and Johannes Tauler, and at Kierkegaard’s exposure to 
the German mystical tradition.  Finally, it will present an account of Kierkegaard’s 
own religious epistemology and proceed to show how this epistemology is largely 
indistinguishable from the epistemology of Ekhardt and Tauler. 
 
I. Mystical Epistemology 
“It is characteristic of mystics,” writes Edward Scribner Ames in his article “Mystic 
Knowledge,”7 “to claim for themselves a kind of knowledge or illumination 
different from ordinary sensuous or reasoned knowledge.”8  “The uniqueness of 
this mystic knowledge,” he continues, “is further emphasized by the fact that it is 
attained by no ordinary means.  It does not lie at the end process of perception or 
of reasoning or of scientific experiment. … Such methods involve effort and lead 
to provisional conclusions.”  But the mystic wants absolute conclusions.  The 
mystic, continues Ames, “thus employ[s] the common processes only in order to 
deny them, to transcend them.”9  
 Mystics, Ames explains, are not “troubled by the question of the existence 
or the reality of God.”10  The passion of the mystic is, rather, “to find God, to 
ascend to his presence, to enter into communion with him.”11 That is, the craving 
of the mystic is “to secure a vital and satisfying relation with the supreme 
reality.”12  Yet to the extent that the supreme reality “is in no way conditioned,”13 
“[n]ot only is the goal of his endeavor unintelligible but the method by which he 
proposes to reach it is non-intellectual. … [M]ystic illumination cannot be 
scientifically or systematically induced.  The subject of it receives it passively.  
After doing his utmost to earn it, or achieve it, the greatest need is that he shall 
be passive and receptive.”14 
In order to understand, however, how such “passivity” and “receptivity” 
can lead to knowledge, we need to look briefly at what it means to know 
something.  Scholars have argued that there are two fundamentally different 
approaches to understanding what it means to know something.  The first sees 
knowledge as, in effect, a reconstruction of reality in the mind of the knower, 
something like a mirror image of the reality that is known.  This view is generally 
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recognized to be characteristic of modernity.  There is a much older view of 
knowledge, however, that interprets it as involving substantial contact with reality, 
a coming together, so to speak, of the knower and the thing known.  This is the 
view that finds expression, for example, in the wax metaphor of the mind from 
Plato’s Theatetus where the things known impress themselves upon the mind of 
the knower.15 
 This substantive view of knowledge was characteristic of the ancient 
world.  For Plato, the ultimate objective of the knower was union with “the good.”  
Plato did not originate the view, however.  “The idea of Divine Union as man’s 
true end,” observes the scholar of mysticism Evelyn Underhill in her classic study 
of the subject, “is…of great antiquity.  Its first appearance in the religious 
consciousness of Europe seems to coincide with the Orphic Mysteries in Greece 
and Southern Italy in the sixth century B.C.”16 What Plato did was to connect the 
idea of such union with knowledge.  
 The view that to know something was to have a kind of contact with it was 
appropriated by Aristotle and spread to such early fathers of the Christian church 
as Clement of Alexandria and Irenaeus, who were heavily influenced by the 
works of both Plato and Aristotle.17  “The most important aspect of Clement’s 
philosophy,” writes Salvatore R.C. Lilla in his book Clement of Alexandria: A 
Study in Christian Platonism and Gnositicsm, “is represented by the idea of 
gnosis.”18  “[T]he idea of gnosis,” he continues however, “is in Clement’s thought, 
closely connected with that of pistis [i.e., faith] (Lilla, 119).  Clement was 
concerned not merely to discredit the gnostics, who, in Lillas’s words “sharply 
distinguished the pistis of the common believers from the higher gnosis which, 
according to them, was a natural gift bestowed as a privilege to only a very few 
persons, the πνευµατικοι” (Lilla, 118-19),19 but also to defend Christianity against 
the accusations of Greek philosophers that it represented an irrational faith, a 
faith that offered no higher knowledge of the truth.  
Man’s aim, according to Clement, “is to know God, to have knowledge of 
God (γνωσις του Θεου): ‘We call upon man,’” writes Clement, “’who was made 
for the contemplation of heaven, and is in truth a heavenly plant, to come to 
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knowledge of God (Protr. 100.3).’”20  There are two respects, however, in which 
one can “know” God. Close examination of the writings of Irenaeus, one of the 
earliest of the early church fathers, reveals that he believes the idea of God is 
built into human consciousness.  God, according to Irenaeus, 
confers on all a great mental intuition and perception of His most mighty, 
yes, almighty greatness. Therefore, though ‘no one knows the Father 
except the Son, nor the Son except the Father, and those to whom the 
Son has revealed Him’ (cf. Matt. 11:27), yet all beings know this fact at 
least [i.e., that there is a God] because reason, implanted in their minds, 
moves them, and reveals to them that there is one God, the Lord of all.21 
(italics added.)   
That is, “[c]reation,” according to Irenaeus, “shows its Creator, and what is made 
suggests its Maker” (33).  One need only be a “lover of truth,” according to 
Irenaeus, in order to see this. 
 This innate knowledge that there is a God is not, however, specifically 
Christian and it is specifically Christian knowledge in which the Church fathers 
are interested.  To the extent that Christianity has always emphasized the 
primacy of faith relative to knowledge, it’s tempting to conclude that there was no 
such thing as specifically Christian knowledge in the early church.  Such a 
conclusion would, however, be mistaken.  Sin, according to the Christian 
tradition, separates man from God, but faith in Christ reunites them.  The view 
that there is specifically Christian knowledge is part of the earliest Christian 
orthodoxy.  The foundation of such knowledge, according to Clement, however, 
is faith-πιστις.  “[T]he two cannot be separated: ‘Now neither is knowledge 
without faith, nor faith without knowledge’” (ηδη δε ουτε η γνωσς ανευ πιστεως 
ουθ η πιστις ανευ γνωσεως) (Strom. 5.1.3) (Hägg, 151).  Or as Wilhelm Scherer 
expresses it: “Ihm steht es von vornherein fest, das sich die Ergebnisse des 
Gnosis nicht von der Regel des Glaubens entfernen können.”22 
But how does faith result in knowledge? Ames is correct in his claim that 
“mystic illumination cannot be scientifically or systematically induced,” that the 
subject … receives it passively, after doing his utmost to earn it, or to achieve 
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it.”23  The answer is that faith is a gift of Grace to those who seek earnestly to 
attain it.  It is the “condition,” as Kierkegaard expresses it in Philosophical 
Crumbs, that one who has surrendered his understanding receives from “the 
god,” and which then conditions his understanding of the truth.  
 
II. The Epistemology of the German Mystics 
Meister Eckhart was born around 1260, and Johannes Tauler was born 
approximately forty years later, around 1300.  Despite the fact that they were 
born long before the Protestant reformation, both were popular with later 
Protestant theologians.  There are a number of reasons for this.  First, like all 
mystics, to paraphrase Ames, they emphasized the exclusive, private character 
of human experience, viewing it as an affair between the individual and God.24  
Second, though both were formally educated (Eckhart received a degree in 
theology from the University of Paris and Tauler studied under Eckhart at the 
Dominican convent in Strasbourg), they wrote in the vernacular.  Eckhart was the 
more speculative of the two and hence influenced the German idealists, 
particularly Hegel.  Both were also somewhat unorthodox. Eckhart was formally 
charged with heresy because of his occasionally unusual language.  Tauler not 
only emphasized the importance of a personal relationship with God, he was a 
universalist. 
 Both Eckhart and Tauler appear to have held, in keeping with the views of 
the Church fathers, that a kind of religious knowledge was possible even outside 
revelation.  Eckhart speaks, for example, of “the natural light of the rational soul” 
as conveying a knowledge of religious truth.25  The reference to “an inward sight” 
that bears a striking resemblance to Irenaeus’ “mental intuition,” occurs also in 
Theologia Deutsch, a work Kierkegaard would have assumed to have been by 
Tauler. This “inward sight,” asserts the author of Theolgia Deutsch, is “able to 
perceive the one true good.”26  Tauler himself, also, refers to a knowledge of God 
that “springeth from within.”27 
Just as was the case, however, with the Church fathers, this innate 
knowledge that there is a God is less important for the German mystics that is 
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specifically Christian knowledge.  The substantive view of epistemology, 
expressed in the idea that faith can bring the believer into a kind of contact with 
God in the person of Christ found its way into the thought of such medieval 
Christian thinkers as Johannes Scottus Eriugena, and eventually to the German 
mystics.  Meister Eckhart asserts, for example, that “[i]n faith alone do we have 
true knowledge.”28 Tauler also refers to “the light of faith as leading to a 
“knowledge of God.”29 
Despite Eckhart’s view that human beings have a kind of innate religious 
knowledge, he asserts that “neither the skills of all creatures, nor your own 
wisdom nor the whole extent of your knowledge can bring you to the point that 
you have a divine knowledge of God.  If you wish to know God in a divine 
manner, then your knowing must become a pure unknowing, a forgetting of 
yourself.”30  “Where you truly go out of your will and your knowledge,” he asserts, 
“God truly and willingly enters in with his knowledge and shines there with great 
brilliance.”31 That is, you must surrender your understanding to God, according to 
Eckhart, and then God, in turn will bestow on you the gift of faith that leads to 
“divine knowledge.”  This faith represents a kind of union with God that leads to 
true knowledge.  Hence Eckhart asserts that “[t]he higher we ascend with our 
knowledge, the more we are one in him.”32 
“[M]an by nature, observes Tauler, “desireth to know [Wissen] all created 
things, and the distinction that he perceives in them is given to him by his natural 
knowledge [Wissen].  And to know begets in him great pleasure, and the 
pleasure driveth him on to know more and more.”33  “[N]atural knowledge 
[Bekenntnisse], according to Tauler, “is not to be denied … for natural knowledge 
[Bekenntnisse], if he be willing, leadeth a man into knowledge of grace, and 
knowledge of grace leadeth him to divine knowledge.”34  That is, it is this 
knowledge that is a product of Grace that is the ultimate objective of the 
Christian.  It is the end toward which he strives even in his progress through 
natural knowledge.  
Natural knowledge does not of itself, however, produce a knowledge of 
Grace.  It merely leads the seeker to the limit of the unaided, or un-illuminated, 
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understanding.  Knowledge of Grace is achieved through Grace, which is to say: 
through the gift of faith and the subsequently illuminated understanding which 
comes to a new knowledge of religious truth.  “[T]o man in a state of grace,” 
asserts Tauler,  
is given the power of distinguishing the Holy Scriptures, so that he 
comprehend them in full truth, and that in bearing and reading he should 
understand them in the best and most profitable way.  And this knowledge 
[Verstentnisse] is by grace and not from nature; for by mere nature you 
cannot come to true knowledge [Bekentnisse] of the Holy Scriptures.  For 
the Holy Scriptures are from the Holy Ghost, and therefore whoso wisheth 
to understand them properly he must be enlightened with the grace of the 
Holy Ghost.35 
This same view is found in the Theologia Deutsch.  “[L]et no one imagine 
that we can attain to this true light and perfect knowledge, and to the life of 
Christ,” writes the author of Theologia Deutsch, “by much questioning, or by 
listening to others, or by reading and study, or by ability and deep learning.”36  
This view of the irrelevance of learning to genuine Christian knowledge is echoed 
in Tauler’s assertion that a genuine knowledge of Christianity is “concealed from 
the learned teachers of this world.”37  
But if learning is irrelevant to genuine Christian existence, knowledge is 
not.  “We are placed in this life,” according to Tauler, “not only to do the works, 
but also so that we may know, so that our works may grow out of knowledge, as 
fruit grows out of the tree.  Therefore our work in this life is to gain more 
knowledge, and so to come nearer to God.”38 
 
III. Kierkegaard’s Exposure to the German Mystical Tradition 
I’m not the first person to recognize mystical elements in Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy.  The Slovakian scholar Peter Sajda has written three pioneering 
articles on this topic39 and much of what I will say here concerning Kierkegaard’s 
exposure to the German mystical tradition I learned from Sajda’s excellent article 
“Kierkegaard’s Encounter with the Rhineland-Flemish Mystics.”40 
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 Kierkegaard’s earliest exposure to mysticism was undoubtedly through the 
Pietist tradition in which he was raised.  The German mystics, and, in particular, 
Johannes Tauler had a very strong influence on this tradition.  Johann Arndt, for 
example, who is considered by many to be a forerunner of Pietism, was heavily 
influenced by Tauler.  There are numerous references to Tauler, as well as many 
direct quotations from Tauler in Arndt’s Wahres Christentum.41  Kierkegaard, in 
turn, admired Arndt and refers favorably to both Arndt and Tauler.  There are 56 
references to Arndt in Kierkegaard’s authorship and 21 references to Tauler.42  
The influence of the mystics extends beyond Pietism.  Martin Luther 
admired Tauler and the mystical work Theologia Deutsch. Mystical emphasis on 
subjectivity and the authority of inner experience was seen by many as 
precursory to the Reformation.  Some of Kierkegaard’s Lutheran sources, 
according to Sajda, “argued that the teachings of the mystics conformed to the 
[protestant] sola fide principle.”43 
 Kierkegaard’s exposure to German mysticism was not limited to its 
transmission through theological works.  Medieval German mysticism was 
popular among German idealist philosophers and was discussed in works 
Kierkegaard owned and read including Adolf Helfferich’s Die christliche Mystik44 
and Hans Lassen Martensen’s monograph: Meister Eckhardt, Et Bidrag til at 
oplyse Middelalderens Mystik 45 
 Nor was Kierkegaard’s exposure to German mysticism primarily indirect, 
through its influence on the Pietists and German idealists. Kierkegaard owned a 
number of original works by mystics such as Tauler and Suso.  He owned a copy 
of Theologia Deutsch as well as the aforementioned work by Martensen that 
included much original material from Eckhardt. Kierkegaard’s library also 
included scholarly studies on mysticism that he read and commented upon.46  
 I have relied, as I explained at the beginning of this section, on Sajda’s 
account of Kierkegaard’s exposure to the German mystical tradition.  Sajda 
appears to believe, however, that the primary respect in which Kierkegaard was 
influenced by mysticism was his incorporation of the mystical notion of the 
“negation of the finite,” or the “via purgativa,” in his own account of “dying to the 
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self.”  He asserts, for example, that “Kierkegaard’s reception of the Rhineland-
Flemish mystics was aimed chiefly at the concept of the via purgativa,” and that 
“[f]rom among the three traditional stages of mystical theology (purgation, 
illumination, union)–which Kierkegaard knew from Theologia Deutsch–he 
focused primarily on the preparatory stage of purgation.”47  I’ll argue, however, 
that the second and third stages, those of illumination and union,48 are at least 
equally, if not more, important in Kierkegaard’s thought. 
 
IV. Kierkegaard’s Religious Epistemology 
Some mystics, observes Kierkegaard, “think they have a direct relation to God 
and thus will not acknowledge that all human beings have only an indirect 
relation ([through] the Church–[or] in the political domain, the state).49  The view 
that one can have a direct relation to God is, of course, problematic for 
Christianity in that it would appear to make Christ superfluous.  There is a sense 
according to Kierkegaard, however, despite this early reference to the contrary, 
in which human beings are directly related to God, a sense that is entirely 
consistent with the Christian tradition. 
The first indication we have that Kierkegaard is a kindred spirit of 
mysticism is the fact that, to use Ames’ words, “he is not troubled by the question 
of the existence or reality of God.”50  He takes these for granted.  Kierkegaard 
appears to hold the view, in keeping with first the Church fathers and then the 
German mystics that human beings have something like innate knowledge that 
there is a God.  Arild Christensen argues, for example, that Kierkegaard 
“emphasizes that God is present in human consciousness”51 and Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonym Johannes de silentio refers to human beings as having an “eternal 
consciousness” that he associates with the love of God.52  It would appear 
Kierkegaard believes the idea of God is built into human consciousness. 
Precisely how this is so is something he doesn’t directly address.  It seems safe 
to assume that it is simply part of the way consciousness is constructed.53  It 
might be associated with a person’s appreciation that his is a finite, or limited, 
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form of rationality, or it might be roughly equivalent to a kind of Schleiermachean 
feeling of absolute dependence. 
“Eternally understood,” asserts Kierkegaard in Philosophical Crumbs, “one 
does not believe that there is a God, even though one assumes that there is.  
This is a misuse of language. Socrates did not have faith that there was a God.  
What he knew about God he achieved through recollection” (C, 153).  This 
reference to “recollection” recurs in Kierkegaard’s journals where he observes 
that both proving that there is a God, and being convinced of this by proofs, are 
“equally fantastic,” 
for just as no one has ever proven it, so has there never been an atheist, 
even though there certainly have been many who have been unwilling to 
let what they knew get control of their minds. … With respect to the 
existence [Tilværelsen] of God, immortality, etc., in short with respect to all 
problems of immanence, recollection applies; it exists altogether in 
everyone only he does not know it. (JP 3:3606.) 
It makes sense that Kierkegaard would have felt no need to defend the 
view that the idea of God is included in the contents of human consciousness.  
This view, as we saw, is part of the earliest Christian orthodoxy.  More 
importantly, in the context of the present project, it is part of the German mystical 
tradition.  
I argue elsewhere that, for Kierkegaard, the idea of God, under certain 
circumstances, amounts to knowledge that there’s a God.  Such knowledge is, as 
we saw earlier, a long way from specifically Christian knowledge.  Some have 
argued that there is no specifically Christian knowledge according to 
Kierkegaard.54  It’s clear, however, that he does believe there’s such knowledge.  
I’ve defended this claim in detail in my book Ways of Knowing.  I’ll not attempt to 
recapitulate that argument here, but will provide only a sketch of the nature of 
Christian knowledge according to Kierkegaard, a sketch in a detail sufficient to 
make clear the similarity between Kierkegaard’s views to those of Eckhart and 
Tauler.  
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“Everything Is New In Christ,” observes Kierkegaard in his journals, “this 
will be my position for a speculative Christian epistemology” (JP 2:2277).  
Christian knowledge, for Kierkegaard, as for Eckhart and Tauler, is built on faith.  
Kierkegaard refers in the Postscript to what he calls “the certainty of faith” (CUP, 
48).  Yet he also claims that faith is a risky venture and if it is a risky venture, it 
would appear problematic to argue that a person could attain certainty as a result 
of it.  “Risking,” Kierkegaard argues, “is the correlative of uncertainty, once 
certainty is there, risking stops” (CUP, 356).  
The certainty of faith is accessible, however, only in the moment of faith 
and thus cannot represent a threat to faith itself.  The instant a person ceases to 
believe in the sense that he ceases to be in the passion of faith, the certainty 
vanishes and to renew faith involves risk in the same sense it did the first time.  
Thus the certainty of faith, according to Kierkegaard, “has in it, at every moment, 
the infinite dialectic of uncertainty” (CUP, 48) not merely in the sense that the 
object of faith appears objectively uncertain, but also in the sense that faith itself 
is difficult to sustain. 
 But the certainty of faith is in no sense arbitrary.  It’s a consequence of the 
believer’s contact with God’s infinite love in the moment of faith.  Every moment 
of faith is characterized by certainty. Indeed, this certainty is, in a sense, 
indistinguishable from faith.55 It’s tempting to conclude that certainty can be a 
product of faith that is original to Kierkegaard. A close examination of German 
mysticism reveals, however, that it is not. Eckhart also speaks of faith as 
producing “unshakeable certainty”56 and Kierkegaard, again, was familiar with 
Eckhart’s thought.  
Christian knowledge, for Kierkegaard, as for Eckhart and Tauler, is a 
product of revelation, and the specific revelation with which Kierkegaard is 
concerned can be characterized as an encounter with Christ, or as 
contemporaneity with Christ, as Kierkegaard expresses it in Philosophical 
Crumbs.57 “Christ is the truth,” (PC, 205), according to Kierkegaard, hence to 
know Christ is to know the truth. 
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It appears, however, that in every instance where Kierkegaard refers to 
“knowledge” of Christ, the Danish expression is either “Kjendskab,” or some form 
of the verb “kjende,” rather than “Erkjendelsen,” or “Viden,” or their associated 
verbs.58  There is even at least one place where Kierkegaard alters the then 
current Danish translation of the New Testament by replacing the expression 
“know” (kiende), in connection with the truth of Christianity, with “experience” 
(erfarer).59 The reference is from his papers where he quotes John 7:17 as: “If 
anyone’s will is to do my father’s will, he shall experience whether the teaching is 
from God or on my own authority” (JP 2:1881).60  
The original Greek expression that was translated into Danish as “kiende” 
and then retranslated by Kierkegaard as “erfarer” is γνωσεται which 
comes from the Greek γνωσις.  Gnosis was used consistently both in 
ancient philosophy and in the writings of the Church fathers to identify what 
contemporary philosophers would call “acquaintace knowledge.”  That is, γνω
σις, refered to knowledge that represented a kind of contanct with the reality in 
question, as opposed to επιστημη, that refered to something more like 
an abstract or conceptual grasp of it.  Kierkegaard’s substitution of “erfarer” for 
“kiende” is important in that it shows he interprets “kiende,” in the tradition of 
γνωσις as referring to a kind of acquaintance knowledge and provides us with a 
key to understanding an early journal entry where Kierkegaard asserts that “[t]he 
historical anticipation of and also the position in human consciousness61 
corresponding to the Christian ‘Credo ut intelligam’ [I believe in order that I might 
understand] is the ancient Nihil est in intellectus quod non antea fuerit in sensu 
[There is nothing in the intellect that has not previously been in the senses]” (JP 
2:1098).  That is, Kierkegaard interprets propositional knowledge of what he calls 
“the truths” of Christianity and the product of an acquaintance with Christ. 
A person meets Christ in the moment of faith.  This meeting is what is 
meant by “knowledge” of Christ, hence acquaintance knowledge of Christ 
precedes Christian knowledge in the propositional sense, just as such 
knowledge, for Tauler, precedes “the power of distinguishing the Holy Scriptures 
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so that [one can] comprehend them in full truth.”62  To become acquainted with 
Christ is an experience that is related to the intellect in a manner analogous to 
the way sense experience is related to the intellect.  
Experience, according to Kierkegaard, belongs to the realm of existence, 
or actuality, hence it cannot, in itself, be equivalent to knowledge (which is why, 
according to Kierkegaard, it cannot be deceptive).  Experience becomes 
knowledge, or a candidate for knowledge, when it is brought into relation to 
ideality in the intellect. Hence Christian knowledge, in the propositional sense, is 
a consequence of, rather than, as some have argued, equivalent to, Christian 
experience.63  “Knowing the truth,” argues Kierkegaard in Practice in Christianity, 
is not equivalent to being the truth, but is something that “follows of itself from 
being the truth” (PC, 205).64  
But if it is possible, according to Kierkegaard, to both know the truth and 
be the truth, then Sajda would appear mistaken in his assertion that “[f]rom 
among the three traditional stages of mystical theology (purgation, illumination, 
union) … [Kierkegaard] focused primarily on the prepatory stage of purgation.”  
Yes, purgation, or dying to the self, is important in Kierkegaard’s authorship, but 
only as a means to the end of establishing the proper relation to the truth, which 
relation is a complex dialectic of illumination (i.e., kendskab), union, and further 
illumination (viden/erkendelsen), just as it is for both Eckhart and Tauler.  
Much more work remains to be done on Kierkegaard’s relation to German 
mysticism, and indeed, on his relation to German thought more generally. It 
ought to be clear, however, from this brief examination of the influence of 
German mysticism on Kierkegaard that not all Germans, according to 
Kierkegaard, were “windbags.” Some had very important things to say, things 
which were influential on the formation of Kierkegaard’s own thought. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 J.S. Ferrall and Thorl. Gudm. Repp, A Danish-English Dictionary (Copenhagen, 
1845), pp. XX-XXI. Emphasis in original. 
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2 These quotations come from a passage in The Sickness Unto Death. Alastair 
Hannay, whose translation of this work is generally superior to the Hongs’ 
translation, unfortunately appears to miss the humor of the passage in that he 
translates “I Mangel af at tale philosophisk, skal tale tydsk” as “if for want of a 
philosophical term, I may say it in German” (The Sickness Unto Death, tran. 
Alastair Hannay [London: Penguin, 1989], 126). A more literal and, I believe, 
accurate, translation is “if owing to an inability to speak philosophically, shall 
speak German.” He’s referring to himself in this passage, but is clearly poking fun 
at his contemporaries, such as Martensen, who often published their works in 
German and who appeared to believe that German thought was somehow 
inherently deeper than was Danish thought.  
 
3 The wording here is taken from Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong’s Søren 
Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1967-
1978). The reference, however, is to the Danish edition of Kierkegaard’s papers: 
Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, eds. P. A. Heiberg, V. Kuhr, E. Torsting and Niels 
Thulstrup. 2nd ed. 16 vols. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1968–1978. The Hongs’ 
translation of Kierkegaard’s papers will eventually be supplanted by a new 
English edition that is currently in production with Princeton University Press, not 
so much because the new translation is better than the Hongs’ (see my review in 
the Scottish Journal of Theology Vol. 63, issue 02: 249-251) but because it will 
be a comprehensive translation which the Hongs’ was not. The new edition will 
include references, however, to the Danish Papirer (as well as references to the 
new Danish edition of Kierkegaard’s papers) so I have elected to include only 
those references here.  
 
4 See, for example, the end of X6 B 128. 
 
5 Ways of Knowing: Kierkegaard’s Pluralist Epistemology (Waco, TX: Baylor 
University Press, 2010). 
 
6 “Kierkegaard’s Encounter with the Rhineland-Flemish Mystics: A Case Study,” 
Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2009: Kierkegaard’s Concept of Irony, eds. Niels 
Jørgen Cappelørn, Hermann Deuser and K. Brian Söderquist (Walter de Gruyter, 
2009), 559-584. 
 
7 Edward Scribner Ames, “Mystic Knowledge,” The American Journal of 
Theology, vol. 19, no. 2 (April 1915) pp. 250-267. 
 
8 Ibid. 250. 
 
9 Ibid. 250. 
 
10 Ibid. 254. 
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11 Ibid. 254. 
 
12 Ibid. 256. 
 
13 Ibid. 261. 
 
14 Ibid. 261. 
 
15 191c-d. 
 
16 Mysticism, (Kindle loc. 10039-10042). See also Erwin Rohde, Psyche: The 
Cult of Souls and the Belief in Immortality among the Greeks, 8th ed., trans. W.B. 
Hillis (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1925), and James Adam, The 
Religious Teachers of Greece (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), Lecture V, 92-
114. 
 
17 I had always been led to believe that of the two ancient thinkers, Plato and 
Aristotle, it was primarily the later who was important for medieval philosophy. 
Clement makes frequent reference, however, to Plato. 
 
18 Slavatore R.C. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and 
Gnositicsm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 118. 
 
19 See, Strom. Ii. 10. 2 (ii. 118. 13-17). 
 
20 Henny Fiskå Hägg, Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian 
Apophatacism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 151. 
 
21 Irenaeus, The Scandal of the Incarnation: Irenaeus Against the Heresies, 
Selected and Introduced by Hans Urs von Balthasar, tran. John Sayward (San 
Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1990), p. 32. 
 
22 Dr. Wilhelm Scherer, Klemens von Alexandrien und seine Erkenntnisprinzipien 
(München, 1907), p. 70. 
 
23 Ames, 261. 
 
24 Ames, 251. 
 
25 See “The Book of Divine Consolation,” in Meister Eckhart, Selected Writings, 
tran. Oliver Davies (Penguin, 1994), 58. 
 
26 Light Life and Love: Selections from the German Mystics of the Middle Ages, 
ed. W.R. Inge, 1904. Christian Classics Ethereal Library, Kindle ed., loc. 1699. 
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27 The Following of Christ, tran. J.R. Morell (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1910), 30. 
Christian Classics Ethereal Library, Kindle ed. 
 
28 Selected Writings, 36. 
 
29 Meditations on the Life and Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ, tran. anonymous 
(Dublin: Thomas Richardson and Son, 1875), 415.  Medieval Library of Mystical 
and Ascetical Works, Kindle ed. 
 
30 Selected Writings, 224. 
 
31 Ibid. 223. 
 
32 Ibid. 129. 
 
33 The Following of Christ, tran. J.R. Morell (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1910), 46. 
Christian Classics Ethereal Library. Enhanced Version, Kindle ed. (p. 26 in 
German version). 
 
34 Ibid. 45 (p. 26 in German). 
 
35 Ibid. 48. 
 
36 “The Life of Christ,” in Light, Life, and Love, loc. 1709-10. 
 
37 The Inner Way: The Mystical Theology of John Tauler, tran. Arthur Wollaston 
Hutton (London: Methuen & Co., 1901. E-SaintLibrary.com. Kindle ed., loc. 3984-
85. 
 
38 Ibid. loc. 2134-36. 
 
39 “The Patriarch of German Speculation who was a Lebemeister: Meister 
Eckhardt’s Silent Way into Kierkegaard’s Corpus,” and “A Teacher in Spiritual 
Diethics: Kierkegaard’s Reception of Johannes Tauler,” Kierkegaard and the 
Patristic and Medieval Traditions, ed. Jon Steward (Ashgate, 2008), 237-253 and 
265-287 respectively, and “Kierkegaard’s Encounter with the Rhineland-Flemish 
Mystics: A Case Study.”  
 
40 Ibid. 
 
41 True Christianity (Mawah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1979. Book 1 was originally 
published in 1605. The remaining books were published between 1606-1610. 
 
42 See Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, eds. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Joakim Garff, 
Johnny Kondrup, Alistair McKinnon and Finn Hauberg Mortensen (Copenhagen: 
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Gads Forlag, 1997-present), Kommentar. Some of these references are explicit 
and others are allusions noted in the commentary to the most recent collected 
works of Kierkegaard in Danish. 
 
43 Sajda, “Kierkegaard’s Encounter with the Rhineland-Flemish Mystics,” 570. 
See also, Stenersen, Udsigt over den Lutherske Reformation, vol. 1, 202 and 
Rudelbach, Christelig Biographie, vol. 1, 54. These latter references are taken 
from note 56 of Sajda’s article. 
 
44 Die christliche Mystic (Gotha, 1842), vol. 1. 
 
45 Copenhagen, 1840.  
 
46 See Joseph Göres Die christliche Mystic (Regensburg and Landshut, 1836-
1842), Martensen, Meister Eckhardt, Helfferich, Die christliche Mystik, and 
Suso’s H., gennant Amandus, Leben and Schriften (These references are taken 
from note 47 on page 569 of Sajda’s “Kierkegaard’s Encounter with the 
Rhineland-Flemish Mystics.” 
 
47 “Kierkegaard’s Encounter with the Rhineland-Flemish Mystics,” 583. 
 
48 It is important to acknowledge at this point that Kierkegaard’s notion of “union” 
differs from the traditional mystical notion in that one cannot actually become one 
with God, according to Kierkegaard. One does, however, as I argue in Ways of 
Knowing, come into contact with the eternal, unchanging truth in one’s encounter 
with God in the person of Christ in the “moment.”  
 
49 Pap. I A 168. June 6, 1836. 
 
50 Ames, 254. 
 
51 Arild Christensen, Efterskriftens Opgør med Martensen [the confrontation with 
Martensen in the Postscript], Kierkegaardiana 4, 1962, p. 59. 
 
52 See, for example, FT, 48. 
 
53 See, for example, SUD, 13; C, 153 and SV, XII, 285. 
 
54 Add reference. 
 
55 See Slotty’s observation that Kierkegaard “strongly emphasized the certainty 
[Selbstgewißheit] of belief” (Slotty, 70). 
 
56 Selected Writings, 24. 
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57 See C, 138-139 and 167-168. 
 
58 See, for example, EUD, 325-326 and C, 136-137. 
 
59 The Greek is γνωσεται. 
 
60 I have altered the translation here slightly because the Hongs do not take 
account of the substitution of “erfarer” for “kiende.” The Greek term in question is 
gnosetai, which is related to the noun gnosis. In another reference from 
Kierkegaard’s journals and papers he translates the expression for “know” in the 
inscription over the oracle at Delphi, gnothi seauton as “kjende” which supports 
the view that Kierkegaard considered gnosis to be knowledge of the substantive, 
or aquaintance, sort. 
 
61 I have altered the Hongs’ translation of “Bevidsthed” from “knowledge” to 
“consciousness” because the former is not an acceptable translation of 
“Bevidsthed” (see Ferrall-Repp, Molbech and Vinterberg-Bodelsen s.v. 
Bevisthed). 
  
62 The Following of Christ, 48. 
 
63 Contra Emmanuel, 139. 
 
64 Emphasis added. 
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